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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
September 27, 1982 Conference
List 15, Sheet 1
No. 82-11
MENNONITE BOARD OF
MISSIONS

v.
ADAMS

State/Civil

Timel1

1 Appellant

states that it filed a Petition to Transfer to the
Indiana Supreme Court, which denied the petition on April 13,
1982.
Appellant does not include the denial in its statement,
but the Clerk's office confirmed that it had a record of the
denial in its file. The action i timely.
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1.
Indiana

tax

Appellant

SUMMARY:

sale

statutes

and

mortgagee

redemption

argues

statutes

that

violate

appellant's due process and equal protection rights because they
fail to give mortgagees proper notice of tax sales and redemption
rights.

,.-----2.

mortgage

in

favor

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:
of appellant and

Moore executed a

the mortgage was

recorded.

Moore was obligated to pay the property taxes but failed to so,
although
The

she

continued

property

Appellant
sale,

subject

concedes

to

that

vappellant

but

to make

her

monthly mortgage

the

mortgage

was

Moore

received

notice

received

no

sold

personal

to

payments.
appellee.

by mail

notice

of

the

because

the

Indiana tax sale statute provides only for notice by publication
and posting to any party other than the owner. Indiana law also
provides that any party with an interest in tax sale property may

~ytime

redeem the property

within

two years of

the tax sale,

although only former owners are notified of the expiration of the
redemption
receive

period

and

constructive

other
notice

parties
through

apparently
publication.

do

not

even

During

the

redemption period, Moore continued to make her mortgage payments,
and never told appellant of the tax sale.
the

---sale

only

after

the

Appellant learned of

r-------·Appellee

redemption period was over.

.

----

then filed an-action to quiet title naming apperrant and Moore as
defendants.

~fault

Moore

never

responded

to

judgment was entered against her.

in favor of appellee on summary judgment.

the

complaint,

and

a

The trial court found

- 3 -

On appeal, the Ind.Ct.App. affirmed against appellant's
contentions that the

tax sale and redemption statutes violated

appellant's due process and equal protection rights because presale tax notice by publication to parties other than the owner
violates due process, no notice of redemption rights violates due
process, and the provision of personal notice of a tax sale to
owners but not to mortgagees violates equal protection.
pre-sale

tax

notice

by

publication,

the

court

As to

relied

on

its

earlier decision in First Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Furnish, 367
N.E.2d

596

(Ind.Ct.App.

1977)

(contai ~ in

juris.st.

Furnish examined the contention that Mullane v.
Trust Co.,
records

\

339 u.s.

must

concluded

be

that

306

(1950)

given

actual

Mullane

and

requires
notice

that

prior

subsequent

at

29).

Hanover Bank

&

a mortgagee who

to

u.s.

tax

sale,

Sup.Ct.

and

cases

(Schroeder v.City of New York, 371 u.s. 208 (1962) and Walker v.
City

of

Hutchinson,

352

u.S.

112

(1956)

required

that

actual

notice be given to owners of affected property, but that actualnotice

protection

owners.
find

not

extended

to

any

group

other

than

Furnish also surveyed state practice, and was able to

only

mortgagees.
(1964).

was

The

one
See

1964
Laz

Furnish

Arizona

case

that

v.

Southwestern

court

concluded

extended

Land
that

Co.,

Mullane
97

mortgagees

Ariz.
were

to
69
not

entitled to Mullane protection because the mortgagee, as a lender
of money, could be expected to protect itself by keeping records
of the mortgagor's payment of taxes.

With respect to appellant's

contention that due process required the state to provide notice
to it of its right of redemption, the court relied on Short v.

-

Texaco, 406 N.E.2d 625

4 -

(Ind. 1980), aff'd 102 S.Ct. 781

(1982),

and held that "(a)s in Short, all mortgagees have notice of the
right of redemption by the enactment of the tax sale statutes and
a grace period of two years granted by those statutes to protect
their

interests."

Finally,

the court held that the legislative

scheme that provides actual notice of a tax sale to an owner, but
only notice

by publication to a mortgagee, withstands rational

basis analysis (increased protection for owners and collection of
taxes)

under

both federal and state standards, which the court

held to be coextensive.

3.

CONTENTIONS:

On appeal, appellant argues that

the court erred in following Furnish, which, appellant contends,
is

in conflict with Mullane and Greene v. Lindsey,

4483 (1982) •

50 U.S.L.W.

Appellant argues that there is substantial conflict

in the state courts as to whether actual notice is required in
tax-sale situations. Appellant contends that the court should not
have relied on Short because its appeal was pending to this Court
at the time, and that, in any event, the decision of this court
that affirmed Short is not applicable because the mineral lapse
statute in Short was self-executing whereas the statutes in the
present case "require a series of affirmative acts by the State."
Appellant

does

not

explicitly

address

the

equal

.

pr~tection

argument apart from listing it as a question presented. Finally,
appellant states that this Court has noted probable jurisdiction
in

cases

similar

to

the

present

reasons not applicable here.

case,

but

has

dismissed

for

- 5 -

4.

DISCUSSION:

Decisions of this Court cited by

appellant concerning actual notice in various situations have not
extended

protection

to

parties

other

than

the

owners

of

the

affected property, with the exception of Greene, which is clearly
distinguishable.
its

position

The state cases that appellant argues support

also

concern

the

owners

of

property

with

the

exception of the 1964 Arizona case, which did extend Mullane to
mortgagees.

The

court

probable

cases

noted

cases

involving

that appellant cites as ones where

jurisdiction and

owners

and

not

then dismissed

mortgagees.

are

Lower

the
also

court

resolution of the equal protection argument seems reasonable and
appellant does not offer any new argument on appeal.

According

to the lower court, appellant offered no authority to show that
the state is required to notify mortgagees of redemption rights,
and appellant offers no argument in the statement other than that
Texaco v.

Short is not applicable,

and his general reliance on

Mullane throughout.
I recommend DWSFQ.
August 9, 1982

There is no responsive motion.
Francione

Op'n in pet'n
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Questions Presented
1.

Does due process require that a mortgagee receive

-------- -

actual notice of a tax sale?
2.

Does due process require that a mortgagee receive
II

, \

actual notice of a right of redemption following a

ta~

sale?

--'W~

3.

Does

it

violate

equal

protection

to

give

actual

notice of a tax sale to an "owner" but not to a mortgagee?

..
"

'•

"

'

I.
A.

Background

Statutory Background
Under certain conditions,

to

recover

delinquent
Ind.

auction.
ducted at

Indiana law permits a county

taxes by selling

Code §6-1.1-24-1

(1978).

the county courthouse,

Monday in August each year,

the property at public
Such auctions are con-

§6-1.1-24-2 (4), on the second

§6-1.1-24-2(5).

Prior to the auc-

tion, the county auditor must post a specified notice "at a publie place of posting in the county courthouse at least three (3)
weeks before the date of sale."
law requires that

~ce

§6-1.1-24-3.

In addition, the

"shall be pr i..E_ted in twg_J3 )

new~apers

~

which

represent

different political parties and which are pub-

lished in the county," §6-l.l-22-4(b), "once each week for three
( 3)

consecutive weeks

before

the

sale,"

§6-1.1-24-3.

P ~ rty

(h+.

--

owners are also entitled to "a notice of the sale by certified ~
-----.__..
-.........
mail
at their last address" 21 days prior to the auction.

-

§6-1.1-24-4.
Indiana law provides a

followi ~

a tax

~tion.

ab...u.)t
in-~

redemption period of two years

During this redemption period, an

terested person may pay the tax delinquency and retain his inter- 2
est in the property.
period,

if no

§6-1.1-25-1.

At the end of the redemption

redemption has occurred,

the tax

sale purchaser

receives a tax deed vesting him with a fee simple absolute estate
free of prior encumbrances.

§6-1.1-25-4.

The

former owner

is

entitled to receive a notice by certified mail between 30 and 60
days before a tax deed is executed.

... ,

•.

§6-1.1-25-6 •

~

B.

.Facts
In 1973, ap'ant Mennonite Board of

veyed certain property on Stevens Avenue in Elkhart, Indiana, to
one Moore.

She, in turn, executed a mortgage on the property in

favor of MBM to secure $14,000 in indebtedness.
the

mortgage

was

that

Moore

--

would

pay property

taxes.

After

1974, however, she neglected to do so--despite the fact that she
continued to make her mortgage payments.

-

On August 8, 1977, the property was sold to ap'ee Adams
at a tax sale for $1,167.75.

The county sent the required notice

to Moore, and published the required public notices.

During the

two-year redemption period, Moore continued to make her mortgage
--------------------~~

-

payments,

but

she did not redeem the property.

On August 10,

1979, Adams received a tax deed for the property, which he recorded on August 14.

MBM did not have actual knowledge of the

sale or the redemption period until after Adams had received and
recorded his tax deed.

c.

Decisions Below
In November,

1979, Adams instituted the present action

against Moore and MBM to quiet his title.

Moore never responded

and a default judgment was entered against her.

MBM defended the

action on the grounds that the tax sale procedure violated the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.

v--

The Elkhart Superior

Court (Jones) granted summary judgment for Adams.
On
Staton,

appeal,

Garrard)

the

~ firmed.

Indiana

Court

The public

of

Appeals

notice

was

(Hoffman,

adequate

to

I

protect mortgagees'

rights prior to the tax sale.

The enactment

of the tax statutes and the two-year redemption period were adequate to protect mortgagees' rights prior to the execution of the
tax

The

deed.

statutory

scheme

survives

an

equal

protect ion

challenge under rational basis scrutiny.
The Indiana Supreme Court denied discretionary review.

II.
A.

Discussion

Notice Prior to the Sale
"'An ele-

The legal standard is well established here.
mentary and

fundamental requirement of due process

ceeding which
calculated,

is

to be accorded finality

under all the circumstances,

in any pro-

is notice

reasonably

to apprise

interested

parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.'"
(1982)
Co., 339

u.s.

Greene v. Lindsey,

(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank

306, 314 (1950))

U.S.
&

Trust

(emphasis added by Greene Court).
has been satisfied here is essen-

Prior

cases

offer

some guidance,

of

involved detainer actions, posting notices on the doors of tenants in a public house project was held
inadequate.

I ~,

which

involved

the

settlement of

ac-

counts of a common trust fund, notice by publication was held to
be adequate when the trust company did not know the addresses of
interested parties, but inadequate when it did know the addresses.

In the latter situation, notice by ordinary mail would have

been adequate.

The circumstances in each case, however, are dif-

ferent, and the final decision must be made on the basis of what
is

"reasonably calculated,

under all the circumstances,

to ap-

prise interested parties of the pendency of the action."
In my view, the Indiana procedures do satisfy due process

~
~

requirements.

------------

Several

factors

influence

this

conclusion.

~ It is important to remember that mortgagees tend to be very
part ~es.

sot._histicated

They are commonly banks.

They are

in-

Y"-~ variably parties that have the financial wherewithal to invest

~
~ge

~ with

sums for substantial periods.

Greene's public housing pro'ect ten nts or Mullane's small

~~~~ nvestors.

~

One cannot equate mortgagees

2)

T ere were simple procedures that MBM could and

should have ta en to protect itself.
year on a date fixed by statute.

Tax sales occur only once a

~

MBM had no excuse not to know

that a tax sale would be held on August 8, 1977.

As a mortgagee,

it should have known to investigate the situation and to learn if
any of its properties were subject to being sold.
uation is

unlik ~

Again the sit-

and Mullane, where detainer actions and

judicial account settlements may happen at any time, and interested

parties

Furthermore,

have

no

particular

reason

to

watch

for

them.

the required investigation in this case would have

been a simple matter, for notice was posted at a specified place
in the county courthouse.

-

It also seems likely that MBM, as an

organization with offices in the

~nty

.........

'WI'

know what the papers of record were.
to ------------------------~---------look for the newspaper notices

in

for over 50

x e ~rs,

would

-----

It thus should have known
late July.

~ MBM

could easily have sent a representative to the auction to protect

its interests,

®

Due process standards must be set with re-

..

spect

to reasonably 1 ikely situations.

As

Mullane recognized,

ordinary mail may be lost, but that does not mean that notice by
ordinary mail is inadequate.

Here the Indiana statutes protect

..,

mortgagees under ordinary circumstances.

I suspect that a mort-

gagor who fails to pay taxes commonly fails to make mortgage payments,

too.

At

the

very

least,

I

would be

surprised

if many

mortgagors continue to make mortgage payments for two years after
their

property has

been auctioned at

a

tax sale.

A mortgagor

with the money to make payments generally would prefer to prevent
I(

the loss of the property under the tax sale.
liar situation ~ such as this,
-~

occur without' the mortgagee

therefore,
learning

It is only in pecu-

that a tax sale would

that

something was wrong

with the mortgagor's finances.

B.

MBM's Other Contentions
If MBM is going to succeed on this appeal, it will have

to do so on its first ground.
tice prior

to

the

tax

Once the Court concludes that no-

sale was adequate,

it

follows

that the

failure to provide notice during the redemption period is also
permissible.

If

anything,

the

notice

prior

to

the

tax

sale

should be greater, since the mortgagee has a better opportunity
to protect its interest prior to the auction.
the

reverse

is

true.

The mortgagee has all

that it had before the sale and,

But in practice,
the opportunities

in addition, has two years for

further investigation.
The

equal

protection

challenge

is

totally

merit ess.

Mortgagees are not a suspect class, so the statutory scheme need

I~

only survive rational basis scrutiny.

There are clear, rational

reasons for distinguishing between property owners and mortgag-

-

ees.

(1)

Owners tend to be less sophisticated,

creater protection.

-

thus requiring

(2) Owners have much more to lose.

An owner

loses the fee simple estate, which in many cases means losing a
basic necessity of life.
nonpossessory

interest

The mortgagee loses only its lien, a

tradition ally accorded

less

protect ion.

The mortgagee generally retains its contractual right to repayment of the de 3t from the mortgagor for whatever that might be
(3)

worth.

The primary purpose of the statutory scheme

insure collection of property taxes.
parties

liable

for

the

taxes.

It

is to ~

Owners are generally the

is

thus

rational

that

they

should receive the principal notice.

These distinctions between

owners

sufficient

and

mortgagees

are

probably

scheme to survive even heightened scrutiny.

to

enable

the

They are certainly

adequate for rational basis scrutiny.

III.
\

~

~ ';J-~rmed.
~

The decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals should be
Under all of the circumstances, the notice provisions

of the tax sale scheme are sufficient to satisfy the requirements

~ of

~5

Conclusion

due process.

The distinctions between owners and mortgagees

are justified for rational reasons.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-11

MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS, APPELLANT v.
RICHARD C. ADAMS
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting .
.Today, the Court departs significantly from its prior decisions and holds that before the State conducts any proceeding that will affect the legally protected interests of any
party, the State must provide notice to that party by means
certain to ensure actual notice as long as the party's identity
and location are "reasonably ascertainable." Ante, p. 7.
Applying this novel and unjustified principle to the ~
present case, the Court decides that the mortgagee involved
deserved more than the notice by publication and posting
that were provided. I dissent because the Court's approach
is unwarranted both as a general rule and as the rule of this
case.
I

In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306,
314 (1950), the Court established that the "elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated
under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections." We emphasized that notice is constitutionally adequate when "the practicalities and peculiarities of the case ... are reasonably met," id., at 314-315.
See also Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 115

7Ai1 ~ ~.

~ ~ ~ ~
~~ Py~/ ~z'/p~
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82-11-DISSENT
2

MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS v. ADAMS

(1956); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208,
211-212 (1962); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444, 449--450
(1982). The key focus is the "reasonableness" of the means
chosen by the State. Mullane, supra, 339 U. S., at 315.
Whether a particular method of notice is reasonable depends
on the outcome of the balance between the "interest of the
State" and "the individual interest sought to protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 314. Of course, "[i]t is
not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that
the [State] ... must adopt." Greene, supra, 456 U. S., at
455, n. 9. It is the primary responsibility of the State to
strike this balance, and we will upset this process only when
the State strikes the balance in an irrational manner.
From Mullane on, the Court has adamantly refused to
commit "itself to any formula acheiving a balance between
these interests in a particular proceeding or determining
when constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must
meet." 339 U. S., at 314. Indeed, we have recognized "the
impossibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the kind of
notice that must be given; notice will vary with the circumstances and conditions." Walker, supra, 352 U. S., at 115
(emphasis added). Our approach in these cases has always
reflected the general principle that "[t]he very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Union, Local.J,73 v. McElroy, 367 U. S.
886, 895 (1961). See also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S.,
319, 334-335 (1976).
A
Although the Court purports to apply these settled principles in this case, its decision today is squarely at odds with
the balancing approach that we have developed. The Court
now holds that whenever a party has a legally protected property interest, "[n]otice by mail or other means as certain to
ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition

.
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to any proceeding which will adversely affect the interest[]
... if [the party's] name and address are reasonably ascertainable." Ante, p. 7. Without knowing what state and
individual interests will be at stake in future cases, the Court
espouses a general principle ostensibly applicable whenever
any legally protected property interest may be adversely affected. This is a flat rejection of the view that no "formula"
can be devised that adequately evaluates the constitutionality of a procedure created by a State to provide notice in a
certain class of cases. Despite the fact that Mullane itself
accepted that constructive notice satisfied the dictates of due
process in certain circumstances/ the Court,· citing Mullane,
now holds that constructive notice can never suffice whenever there is a legally protected property interest at stake.
In seeking to justify this broad rule, the Court holds that
although a party's inability to safeguard its interests may result in imposing greater notice burdens on the State, the fact
that a party may be more able "to safeguard its interests does
not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation." Ante,
p. 7. Apart from ignoring the fact that it is the totality of
circumstances that determines the content of the State's obligation to provide notice in particular cases, the Court also
neglects to consider that the constitutional obligation imposed upon the State may itself be defined by the party's ability to protect its interest. As recently as last Term, the
Court held that the focus of the due process inquiry has always been the effect of a notice procedure on "a particular
class of cases." Greene, supra, 456 U. S., at 451 (emphasis
added). In fashioning a broad rule for "the least sophisticated creditor," ante, p. 7, the Court ignores the well-settled
principle that "procedural due process rules are shaped by
'In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 U. S. 306, 314
(1950), we held that "[p]ersonal service has not in all circumstances been
regarded as indispensable to the process due to residents, and it has more
often been held unnecessary as to nonresidents."
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the risk of error inherent in the truth finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions."
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 344 (1976); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 696 (1979). If the members of a particular class generally possess the ability to safeguard their interests, then this fact must be taken into
account when we consider the "totality of circumstances," as
Indeed, the criterion established by
required by Mullane.
Mullane "'is not the possibility of conceivable injury but the
just and reasonable character of the requirements, having
reference to the subject with which the statute deals."' 339
U. S., at 315 (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219
u. s. 47, 67 (1911).
B
The Court also holds that the condition for receiving notice
under its new approach is that the name and address of the
party must be "reasonably ascertainable." In applying this
requirement to the mortgagee in this case, the Court holds
that the State must exercise "reasonably diligent efforts" in
determining the address of the mortgagee, id., at 6, n. 3, and
suggests that the State is required to make some effort "to
discover the identity and the whereabouts of a mortgagee
whose identity is not in the public record." Ibid. Again, the
Court departs from our prior cases. In all of the cases relied
on by the Court in its analysis, the State either actually knew
the identity or incapacity of the party seeking notice, or that
identity was "very easily ascertainable." Schroeder, supra,
371 U. S., at 212-213. See also Mullane, supra, 339 U. S.,
at 318; Covey v. Town of Summers, supra, 351 U. S. 141, 146
(1956); Walker, supra, 352 U. S., at 116, Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 175 (1974). 2 Under the Court's de2
In Mullane, the Court contrasted those parties who identity and
whereabouts are known or "at hand" with those "whose interests or
whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained." 339 U. S., at
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cision today, it is not clear how far the State must go in providing for reasonable efforts to ascertain the name and address of an affected party. This uncertainty becomes
particularly ominous in the light of the fact that the duty to
ascertain identity and location, and to notify by mail or other
similar means, exists whenever any legally protected interest
is implicated.
II

Once the Court effectively rejects Mullane and its progeny
by accepting a per se rule against constructive notice, it applies its rule and holds that the mortgagee in this case must
receive personal service or mailed notice because it has a legally protected interest at stake, and because the mortgage
was publicly recorded. See ante, p. 6. If the Court had observed its prior decisions and engaged in the balancing required by Mullane, it would have reached the opposite
result.
-It cannot be doubted that the State has a vital interest in
the collection of its tax revenues in whatever reasonable
manner that it chooses: "In authorizing the proceedings to
enforce the payment of the taxes upon lands sold to a purchaser at tax sale, the State is in exercise of its sovereign
power to raise revenue essential to carry on the affairs of
state and the due administration of the laws .... 'The process of taxation does not require the same kind of notice as is
required in a suit at law, or even in proceedings for taking
private property under the power of eminent domain.' "
Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 89 (1904) (quoting Bell's Gap
Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 239
318, 317. This language must be read in the light of the facts of Mullane,
in which the identity and location of certain beneficiaries were actually
known. In addition, the Court in Mullane expressly rejected the view
that a search "under ordinary standards of diligence" was required in that
case. Id., at 317.
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(1890)). The State has decided to accommodate its vital interest in this respect through the sale of real property on
which payments of property taxes have been delinquent for a
certain period of time. 3
The State has an equally strong interest in avoiding the
burden imposed by the requirement that it must exercise
"reasonable" efforts to ascertain the identity and location of
any party with a legally protected interest. In the instant
case, that burden is not limited to mailing notice. Rather,
the State must have someone check the records and ascertain
with respect to each delinquent tax payer whether there is a
mortgagee, perhaps whether the mortgage has been paid off,
and whether there is a dependable address.
Against these vital interests of the State, we must weigh
the interest possessed by the relevant class-in this case,
mortgagees. 4 Contrary to the Court's approach today, this
interest may not be evaluated simply by reference to the fact
that we have frequently found constructive notice to be inadequate since Mullane. Rather, such interest "must be
judged in the light of its practical application to the affairs of
men as they are ordinarily conducted." North Laramie ·
Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1925).
Chief Justice Marshall wrote long ago that "it is part of
common prudence for all those who have any interest in
[property], to guard that interest by persons who are in a
situation to protect it." The Mary, 13 U. S. (9 Cranch) 126,
144 (1815). We have never rejected this principle, and, in3
The Court suggests that the notice that it requires "may ultimately
relieve the county of a more substantial administrative burden if the mortgagee arranges for payment of the delinquent taxes prior to the tax sale."
Ante, p. 7, 4. The Court neglects the fact that the State is a better judge
of how it wants to settle its tax debts than is this Court.
'This is not to say that the rule espoused must cover all conceivable
mortgagees in all conceivable circumstances. The flexibility of due process is sufficient to accommodate those atypical members of the class of
mortgagees.
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deed, we held in Mullane that "[a] State may ~ndulge" the assumption that a property owner "usually arranges means to
learn of any direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary
rights." 339 U. S., at 316. When we have found constructive notice to be inadequate, it has always been where an
owner of property is, for all purposes, unable to protect his
interest because there is no practical way for him to learn of
state action that threatens to affect his property interest.
In each case, the adverse action was one that was completely
unexpected by the owner, and the owner would become
aware of the action only by the fortuitous occasion of reading
"an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages
of a newspaper ... [that may] not even name those whose
attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention." Mullane,
supra, 339 U. S., at 315. In each case, the individuals had
no reason to expect that their property interests were being
affected.
This is not.the case as far as tax sales and mortgagees are
concerned. Unlike condemnation or an unexpected accounting, the assessment of taxes occurs with regularity and
predictability, and the state action in this case cannot reasonably characterized as unexpected in any sense. Unlike the
parties in our other ~ases, the Mennonite Board had a
regular event, the'assessment of taxes, upon which to focus,
in its effort to protect its interest. Further, approximately
95% of the mortgage debt outstanding in the United States is
held by private institutional lenders and federally-supported
agencies. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 1982-83, 511 (103d ed.). 5 It is highly un6
The Court holds that "a mortgage need not involve a complex commercial transaction among knowledgeable parties . . . ." Ante, p. 7. This is
certainly true; however, that does not change the fact that even if the
Board is not a professional money lender, it voluntarily entered into a fairly
sophisticated transaction with Moore. As the court below observed: "The
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likely, if likely at all, that a significant number of mortgagees
are unaware of the consequences that ensue when their mortgagors fail to pay taxes assessed on the mortgaged property.
Indeed, in this case, the Board itself required that Moore pay
all property taxes.
There is no doubt that the Board could have safeguarded
its interest with a minimum amount of effort. The county
auctions of property commence by statute on the second
Monday of each year. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-2(5). The
county auditor is required to post notice in the county courthouse at least three weeks before the date of sale. Ind.
Code§ 6-1.1-24-3(a). The auditor is also required to publish
notice in two different newspapers once each week for three
weeks before the sale. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-3(a); Ind. Code
6-1.1-22-4(b). The Board could have supplemented the protection offered by the State with the additional measures
suggested by the court below: The Board could have required
that Moore provide it with copies of paid tax assessments, or
could have required that Moore deposit the tax monies in an
escrow account, or could have itself checked the public
records to determine whether the tax assessment had been
paid. Pet. for Cert. 27.
When a party is unreasonable in failing to protect its interest despite its ability to do so, due process does not require
that the State save the party from its own lack of care. The
balance required by Mullane clearly weighs in favor of finding that the Indiana statutes satisfied the requirements of
due process. Accordingly, I dissent.

State cannot reasonably be expected to assume the risk of its citizens' business ventures." Pet. for Cert. 27, n. 9.

Justice
Justice
7 Justice
/
Justice
Justice
·Justice
From:

White
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

Justice Marshall
MAY 12 1983

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No . 82-11

MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS, APPELLANT v.
RICHARD C. ADAMS
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE MARSHALL, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal raises the question whether notice by publication and posting provides a mortgagee of real property with
adequate notice of a proceeding to sell the mortgaged property for nonpayment of taxes.

I
To secure an obligation to pay $14,000, Alfred Jean Moore
executed a mortgage in favor of appellant Mennonite Board
of Missions (MBM) on property in Elkhart, Indiana, that
Moore had purchased from MBM. The mortgage was recorded in the Elkhart County Recorder's Office on March 1,
1973. Under the terms of the agreement, Moore was responsible for paying all of the property taxes. Without
MBM's knowledge, however, she failed to pay taxes on the
property.
Indiana law provides for the annual sale of real property on
which payments of property taxes have been delinquent for
fifteen months or longer. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-1 et seq.
Prior to the sale, the county auditor must post notice in the
county courthouse and publish notice once each week for
three consecutive weeks. § 6-1.1-24-3. The owner of the
property is entitled to notice by certified mail to his last
known address. § 6-1.1-24-4. 1 Until 1980, however, Indi' Because a mortgagee has no title to the mortgaged property under
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ana law did not provide for notice by mail or personal service
to mortgagees of property that was to be sold for nonpayment of taxes. 2
After the required notice is provided, the county treasurer
holds a public auction at which the real property is sold to
the highest bidder. § 6--1.1-24-5. The purchaser acquires a
certificate of sale which constitutes a lien against the real
property for the entire amount paid. § 6--1.1-24-9. This
lien is superior to all other liens against the property which
existed at the time the certificate was issued. Ibid.
The tax sale is followed by a two-year redemption period
during which the "owner, occupant, lienholder, or other person who has an interest in" the property may redeem the
property. § 6--1.1-25--1. To redeem the property an individual must pay the county treasurer a sum sufficient to
cover the purchase price of the property at the tax sale, the
amount of taxes and special assessments paid by the purchaser following the sale, plus an additional percentage specified in the statute. §§ 6--1.1-25--2, 6--1.1-25--3. The county
in turn remits the payment to the purchaser of the property
at the tax sale.
If no one redeems the property during the statutory redemption period, the purchaser may apply to the county auditor for a deed to the property. Before executing and delivering the deed, the county auditor must notify the former
owner that he is still entitled to redeem the property.
§ 6--1.1-25--6. No notice to the mortgagee is required. If
Indiana law, the mortgagee is not considered an "owner" for purposes
of§ &-1.1-24--4. First Savings & Loan Assn. of Central Indiana v. Furnish, 367 N. E. 2d 596, 600, n. 14 (Ind. App. 1977).
' Ind. Code § &-1.1-24--4.2, added in 1980, provides for notice by certified mail to any mortgagee of real property which is subject to tax sale
proceedings, if the mortgagee has annually requested such notice and has
agreed to pay a fee, not to exceed $10, to cover the cost of sending notice.
Because the events in question in this case occurred before the 1980
amendment, the constitutionality of the amendment is not before us.

'
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the property is not redeemed within thirty days, the county
auditor may then execute and deliver a deed for the property
to the purchaser, § &--1.1-25--4, who thereby acquires "an estate in fee simple absolute, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances." § &--1.1-25--4(d).
After obtaining a deed, the purchaser may initiate an action to quiet his title to the property. § 6.1.1-25-14. The
previous owner, lienholders, and others who claim to have an
interest in the property may no longer redeem the property.
They may defeat the title conveyed by the tax deed only by
proving, inter alia, that the property had not been subject
to, or assessed for, the taxes for which it was sold, that the
taxes had been paid before the sale, or that the property was
properly redeemed before the deed was executed. § 6.1.125-16.

In 1977 Elkhart County initiated proceedings to sell
Moore's property for nonpayment of taxes. The County provided notice as required under the statute: it posted and
published an announcement of the tax sale and mailed notice
to Moore by certified mail. MBM was not informed of the
pending tax sale either by the county auditor or by Moore.
The property was sold for $1,167.75 to appellee Richard Adams on August 8, 1977. Neither Moore nor MBM appeared
at the sale or took steps thereafter to redeem the property.
Following the sale of her property, Moore continued to make
payments each month to MBM, and as a result MBM did not
realize that the property had been sold. On August 16,
1979, MBM first learned of the tax sale. By then the redemption period had run and Moore still owed appellant
$8,237.19.

In November 1979, Adams filed a suit in state court seeking to quiet title to the property. In opposition to Adams'
motion for summary judgment, MBM contended that it had
not received constitutionally adequate notice of the pending
tax sale and of the opportunity to redeem the property following the tax sale. The trial court upheld the Indiana tax
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sale statute against this constitutional challenge. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. 427 N. E. 2d 686 (1981).
We noted probable jurisdiction,-- U. S. - - (1982), and
we now reverse.
II

In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co ., 339
U. S. 306, 314 (1950), this Court recognized that prior to an
action which will affect an interest in life, liberty, or property
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a State must provide "notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections." Invoking this "elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process," ibid, the Court
held that published notice of an action to settle the accounts
of a common trust fund was not sufficient to inform beneficiaries of the trust whose names and addresses were known.
The Court explained that notice by publication was not reasonably calculated to provide actual notice of the pending
proceeding and was therefore inadequate to inform those who
could be notified by more effective means such as personal
service or mailed notice:
"Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back
pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside
the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds
that the information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced
when as here the notice required does not even name
those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does
not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention.
In weighing its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence
with actual notice we are unable to regard this as more
than a feint." Id., at 315.

•'
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In subsequent cases, this Court has adhered unwaiveringly
to the principle announced in Mullane. In Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112 (1956), for example, the Court
held that notice of condemnation proceedings published in a
local newspaper was an inadequate means of informing a
landowner whose name was known to the city and was on the
official records. Similarly, in Schroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U. S. 208 (1962), the Court concluded that publication in a newspaper and posted notices were inadequate to
apprise a property owner of condemnation proceed~nJs when
his name and address were readily ascertainable ~om both
deed records and tax rolls. Most recently, in Greene v. l
Lindsey,-- U. S. - - (1982), we held that posting a summons on the door of a tenant's apartment was an inadequate
means of providiyg notice of forcible entry and detainer actions. See als<VMemphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,
436 U. S. 1, 13-15 (1978)( Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U. S. 156, 174-175 (1974); Bank of Marin v. England, 385
U. S. 99, 102 (1966); Covey v. Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 146-147
(1956); City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co .,
344

u. s. 293, 296-297 (1953).

This case is controlled by the analysis in Mullane. To
begin with, a mortgagee possesses a substantial property interest that is significantly affected by a tax sale. Under Indiana law, a mortgagee acquires a lien on the owner's property which may be conveyed together with the mortgagor's
personal obligation to repay the debt secured by the mortgage. Ind. Code § 32-8-11-7. A mortgagee's security interest generally has priority over subsequent claims or liens
attaching to the property, and a purchase money mortgage
takes precedence over virtually all other claims or liens including those which antedate the execution of the mortgage.
Ind. Code § 32-8-11-4. The tax sale immediately and drastically diminishes the value of this security interest by granting the tax-sale purchaser a lien with priority over that of all
other creditors. Ultimately, the tax sale may result in the

1
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complete nullification of the mortgagee's interest, since the
purchaser acquires title free of all liens and other encum\
brances at the conclusion of the redemption period.
Since a mortgagee clearly has a legally protected property
interest, he is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale. Cf. Wiswall v. Sampson, 55
U. S. 52, 67 (1852). When the mortgagee is identified in a
mortgage that is p~d, the county may employ
notice by mail, personal service, or any other method equally
likely to ensure that Qgjs in fact notified. 3 But constructive notice to a mortgagee does not satisfy the mandate of
Mullane.
Neither notice by publication and posting, nor mailed notice to the property owner, are means "such as one desirous
of actually informing the [mortgagee] might reasonably adopt
to accomplish it." Mullane, supra, at 315. Because they
are designed primarily to attract prospective purchasers to
the tax sale, publication and posting are unlikely to reach
those who, although they have an interest in the property, do
not make special efforts to keep abreast of such notices.
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, supra, at 116; New York v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra, at 296; Mullane,
supra, at 315. Notice to the property owner, who is not in
privity with his creditor and who has failed to take steps neeIn this case, the mortgage on file with the county recorder identified
the mortgagee only as "MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS a corporation, of Wayne County, in the State of Ohio." We assume that the mortgagee's address could have been ascertained by reasonably diligent efforts.
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317
(1950). Simply mailing a letter to "Mennonite Board of Missions, Wayne
County, Ohio," quite likely would have provided actual notice, given "the
well-known skill of postal officials and employees in making proper delivery
of letters defectively addressed." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385,
397-398 (1914). We do not suggest, however, that a governmental body is
required to undertake extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and
whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public record.
3
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essary to preserve his own property interest, also cannot be
expected to lead to actual notice to the mortgagee. Cf. N elson v. New York City, 352 U. S. 103, 107-109 (1956). The
County's use of these less reliable forms of notice is not reasonable where, as here, "an inexpensive and efficient mechanism such as mail service is available." Greene v. Lindsey,
supra, at - - .
Personal service or mailed notice is re uired even though
sopli1sticate ere i ors have means at their disposal to
discover whether property taxes have not been paid and
whether tax sale proceedings are therefore likely to be initiated. In the first place, a mortgage need not involve a complex commercial transaction among knowledgeable parties,
and it may well be the least sophisticated creditor whose security interest is threatened by a tax sale. More importantly, a party's ability to take steps to safeguard its interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation.
It is true that particularly extensive efforts to provide notice
may often be required when the State is a~re of a party's
inexperience or incompetence. See, e. g., Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, supra, at 13--15; Covey v.
Somers, supra. But it does not follow that the State may
forego even the relatively modest administrative burden of
providing notice by mail to parties who are particularly resourceful.4 Cf. New York v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.,
supra, at 297. Notice by mail or other means as certain to
ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition
to a proceeding which will adversely affect the interests of
any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial
practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable. Furthermore, a mortgagee's knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice
'Indeed, notice by mail to the mortgagee may ultimately relieve the
county of a more substantial administrative burden if the mortgagee arranges for payment of the delinquent taxes prior to the tax sale.

?
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that a tax sale is pending. The latter "was the information
which the [County] was constitutionally obliged to give personally to the appellant-an obligation which the mailing of a
single letter would have discharged." Schroeder v. City of
New York, supra, at 214.
We therefore conclude that the manner of notice provided
to appellant did not meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Accordingly,
the judgment of the Indiana Court of Appeals is reversed and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

' This appeal also presents the question whether, before the county auditor executes and delivers a deed to the tax-sale purchaser, the mortgagee
is constitutionally entitled to notice of its right to redeem the property.
Cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 229 (1946). Because we conclude that
the failure to give adequate notice of the tax sale proceeding deprived appellant of due process of law, we need not reach this question.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-11

MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS, APPELLANT v.
RICHARD C. ADAMS
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting .
.Today, the Court departs significantly from its prior decisions and holds that before the State conducts any proceeding that will affect the legally protected interests of any
party, the State must provide notice to that party by means
certain to ensure actual notice as long as the party's identity
and location are "reasonably ascertainable." Ante, p. 7.
Applying this novel and unjustified principle to the th
present case, the Court decides that the mortgagee involved
deserved more than the notice by publication and posting
that were provided. I dissent because the Court's approach
is unwarranted both as a general rule and as the rule of this
case.
I

In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306,
314 (1950), the Court established that the "elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated
under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections." We emphasized that notice is constitutionally adequate when "the practicalities and peculiarities of the case ... are reasonably met," id., at 314-315.
See also Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 115
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(1956); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208,
211-212 (1962); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444, 449--450
(1982). The key focus is the "reasonableness" of the means
chosen by the State. Mullane, supra, 339 U. S., at 315.

Whether a particular method of notice is reasonable depends
on the outcome of the balance between the "interest of the
State" and "the individual interest sought to protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 314. Of course, "[i]t is
not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that
the [State] ... must adopt." Greene, supra, 456 U. S., at
455, n. 9. It is the primary responsibility of the State to
strike this balance, and we will upset this process only when
the State strikes the balance in an irrational manner.
From Mullane on, the Court has adamantly refused to
commit "itself to any formula acheiving a balance between
these interests in a particular proceeding or determining
when constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must
meet." 339 U. S., at 314. Indeed, we have recognized "the
impossibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the kind of
notice that must be given; notice will vary with the circumstances and conditions." Walker, supra, 352 U. S., at 115
(emphasis added). Our approach in these cases has always
reflected the general principle that "[t]he very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Union, Local.J,73 v. McElroy, 367 U. S.
886, 895 (1961). See also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S.,
319, 334--335 (1976).

.

A
Although the Court purports to apply these settled principles in this case, its decision today is squarely at odds with
the balancing approach that we have developed. The Court
now holds that whenever a party has a legally protected property interest, "[n]otice by mail or other means as certain to
ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition
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to any proceeding which will adversely affect the interest[]
... if [the party's] name and address are reasonably ascertainable." Ante, p. 7. Without knowing what state and
individual interests will be at stake in future cases, the Court
espouses a general principle ostensibly applicable whenever
any legally protected property interest may be adversely affected. This is a flat rejection of the view that no "formula"
can be devised that adequately evaluates the constitutionality of a procedure created by a State to provide notice in a
certain class of cases. Despite the fact that Mullane itself
accepted that constructive notice satisfied the dictates of due
process in certain circumstances,' the Court,· citing Mullane,
now holds that constructive notice can never suffice whenever there is a legally protected property interest at stake.
In seeking to justify this broad rule, the Court holds that
although a party's inability to safeguard its interests may result in imposing greater notice burdens on the State, the fact
that a party may be more able "to safeguard its interests does
not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation." Ante,
p. 7. Apart from ignoring the fact that it is the totality of
circumstances that determines the content of the State's obligation to provide notice in particular cases, the Court also
neglects to consider that the constitutional obligation imposed upon the State may itself be defined by the party's ability to protect its interest. As recently as last Term, the
Court held that the focus of the due process inquiry has always been the effect of a notice procedure on "a particular
class of cases." Greene, supra, 456 U. S., at 451 (emphasis
added). In fashioning a broad rule for "the least sophisticated creditor," ante, p. 7, the Court ignores the well-settled
principle that "procedural due process rules are shaped by
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314
(1950), we held that "[p]ersonal service has not in all circumstances been
regarded as indispensable to the process due to residents, and it has more
often been held unnecessary as to nonresidents."
1

...
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the risk of error inherent in the truth finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions."
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 344 (1976); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 696 (1979). If the members of a particular class generally possess the ability to safeguard their interests, then this fact must be taken into
account when we consider the "totality of circumstances," as
Indeed, the criterion established by
required by Mullane.
Mullane "'is not the possibility of conceivable injury but the
just and reasonable character of the requirements, having
reference to the subject with which the statute deals."' 339
U. S., at 315 (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219
u. s. 47, 67 (1911).
B
The Court also holds that the condition for receiving notice
under its new approach is that the name and address of the
party must be "reasonably ascertainable." In applying this
requirement to the mortgagee in this case, the Court holds
that the State must exercise "reasonably diligent efforts" in
determining the address of the mortgagee, id., at 6, n. 3, and
suggests that the State is required to make some effort "to
discover the identity and the whereabouts of a mortgagee
whose identity is not in the public record." Ibid. Again, the
Court departs from our prior cases. In all of the cases relied
on by the Court in its analysis, the State either actually knew
the identity or incapacity of the party seeking notice, or that
identity was "very easily ascertainable." Schroeder, supra,
371 U. S., at 212-213. See also Mullane, supra, 339 U. S.,
at 318; Covey v. Town of Summers, supra, 351 U. S. 141, 146
(1956); Walker, supra, 352 U. S., at 116, Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974). 2 Under the Court's de2
In Mullane , the Court contrasted those parties who identity and
whereabouts are known or "at hand" with those "whose interests or
whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained." 339 U. S., at

'.
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cision today, it is not clear how far the State must go in providing for reasonable efforts to ascertain the name and address of an affected party. This uncertainty becomes
particularly ominous in the light of the fact that the duty to
ascertain identity and location, and to notify by mail or other
similar means, exists whenever any legally protected interest
is implicated.
II
Once the Court effectively rejects Mullane and its progeny
by accepting a per se rule against constructive notice, it applies its rule and holds that the mortgagee in this case must
receive personal service or mailed notice because it has a legally protected interest at stake, and because the mortgage
was publicly recorded. See ante, p. 6. If the Court had observed its prior decisions and engaged in the balancing required by Mullane, it would have reached the opposite
result.
·It cannot be doubted that the State has a vital interest in
the collection of its tax revenues in whatever reasonable
manner that it chooses: "In authorizing the proceedings to
enforce the payment of the taxes upon lands sold to a purchaser at tax sale, the State is in exercise of its sovereign
power to raise revenue essential to carry on the affairs of
state and the due administration of the laws .... 'The process of taxation does not require the same kind of notice as is
required in a suit at law, or even in proceedings for taking
private property under the power of eminent domain.'"
Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 89 (1904) (quoting Bell's Gap
Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 239
318, 317. This language must be read in the light of the facts of Mullane,
in which the identity and location of certain beneficiaries were actually
known. In addition, the Court in Mullane expressly rejected the view
that a search "under ordinary standards of diligence" was required in that
case. Id., at 317.
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(1890)). The State has decided to accommodate its vital interest in this respect through the sale of real property on
which payments of property taxes have been delinquent for a
certain period of time. 3
The State has an equally strong interest in avoiding the
burden imposed by the requirement that it must exercise
"reasonable" efforts to ascertain the identity and location of
any party with a legally protected interest. In the instant
case, that burden is not limited to mailing notice. Rather,
the State must have someone check the records and ascertain
with respect to each delinquent tax payer whether there is a
mortgagee, perhaps whether the mortgage has been paid off,
and whether there is a dependable address.
Against these vital interests of the State, we must weigh
the interest possessed by the relevant class-in this case,
mortgagees. 4 Contrary to the Court's approach today, this
interest may not be evaluated simply by reference to the fact
that we have frequently found constructive notice to be inadequate since Mullane. Rather, such interest "must be
judged in the light of its practical application to the affairs of
men as they are ordinarily conducted." North Laramie
Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1925).
Chief Justice Marshall wrote long ago that "it is part of
common prudence for all those who have any interest in
[property], to guard that interest by persons who are in a
situation to protect it." The Mary, 13 U. S. (9 Cranch) 126,
144 (1815). We have never rejected this principle, and, ina The Court suggests that the notice that it requires "may ultimately
relieve the county of a more substantial administrative burden if the mortgagee arranges for payment of the delinquent taxes prior to the tax sale."
Ante, p. 7, 4. The Court neglects the fact that the State is a better judge
of how it wants to settle its tax debts than is this Court.
• This is not to say that the rule espoused must cover all conceivable
mortgagees in all conceivable circumstances. The flexibility of due process is sufficient to accommodate those atypical members of the class of
mortgagees.
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deed, we held in Mullane that "[a] State may indulge" the assumption that a property owner "usually arranges means to
learn of any direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary
rights." 339 U. S., at 316. When we have found constructive notice to be inadequate, it has always been where an
owner of property is, for all purposes, unable to protect his
interest because there is no practical way for him to learn of
state action that threatens to affect his property interest.
In each case, the adverse action was one that was completely
unexpected by the owner, and the owner would become
aware of the action only by the fortuitous occasion of reading
"an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages
of a newspaper ... [that may] not even name those whose
attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention." Mullane,
supra, 339 U. S., at 315. In each case, the individuals had
no reason to expect that their property interests were being
affected.
This is not the case as far as tax sales and mortgagees are
concerned. Unlike condemnation or an unexpected accounting, the assessment of taxes occurs with regularity and
predictability, and the state action in this case cannot reasonably characterized as unex ected in any sense. Unlike the
parties in our other ath6f cases, the Mennonite Board had a
regular event, the assessment of taxes, upon which to focus,
in its effort to protect its interest. Further, approximately
95% of the mortgage debt outstanding in the United States is
held by private institutional lenders and federally-supported
agencies. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 1982-83, 511 (103d ed.). 5 It is highly un~ The Court holds that "a mortgage need not involve a complex commercial transaction among knowledgeable parties .... " Ante, p. 7. This is
certainly true; however, that does not change the fact that even if the
Board is not a professional money lender, it voluntarily entered into a fairly
sophisticated transaction with Moore. As the court below observed: "The
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likely, if likely at all, that a significant number of mortgagees
are unaware of the consequences that ensue when their mortgagors fail to pay taxes assessed on the mortgaged property.
Indeed, in this case, the Board itself required that Moore pay
all property taxes.
There is no doubt that the Board could have safeguarded
its interest with a minimum amount of effort. The county
auctions of property commence by statute on the second
Monday of each year. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-2(5). The
county auditor is required to post notice in the county courthouse at least three weeks before the date of sale. Ind.
Code § 6-1.1-24-3(a). The auditor is also required to publish
notice in two different newspapers once each week for three
weeks before the sale. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-3(a); Ind. Code
6-1.1-22-4(b). The Board could have supplemented the protection offered by the State with the additional measures
suggested by the court below: The Board could have required
that Moore provide it with copies of paid tax assessments, or
could have required that Moore deposit the tax monies in an
escrow account, or could have itself checked the public
records to determine whether the tax assessment had been
paid. Pet. for Cert. 27.
When a party is unreasonable in failing to protect its interest despite its ability to do so, due process does not require
that the State save the party from its own lack of care. The
balance required by Mullane clearly weighs in favor of finding that the Indiana statutes satisfied the requirements of
due process. Accordingly, I dissent.

State cannot reasonably be expected to assume the risk of its citizens' business ventures." Pet. for Cert. 27, n. 9.
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Please join me in your dissenting opinion.
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Dear Thurgood:
I think I can join you if you will insert something
along these lines:
"If the mortgagee is identified in the
mortgage of record, constructive notice by
publication must be supplemented by notice
mailed to the mortgagor's last known available
address, or by personal service. But if the
mortgagee is not readily identifiable
constructive notice satisfies the requirements
of Mullane."
This would replace the two final sentences, first
full paragraph p. 6.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-11

MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS, APPELLANT v.
RICHARD C. ADAMS
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE MARSHALL, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal raises the question whether notice by publication and posting provides a mortgagee of real property with
adequate notice of a proceeding to sell the mortgaged property for nonpayment of taxes.
I
To secure an obligation to pay $14,000, Alfred Jean Moore
executed a mortgage in favor of appellant Mennonite Board
of Missions (MBM) on property in Elkhart, Indiana, that
Moore had purchased from MBM. The mortgage was recorded in the Elkhart County Recorder's Office on March 1,
1973. Under the terms of the agreement, Moore was responsible for paying all of the property taxes. Without
MBM's knowledge, however, she failed to pay taxes on the
property.
Indiana law provides for the annual sale of real property on
which payments of property taxes have been delinquent for
fifteen months or longer. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-1 et seq.
Prior to the sale, the county auditor must post notice in the
county courthouse and publish notice once each week for
three consecutive weeks. § 6-1.1-24-3. The owner of the
property is entitled to notice by certified mail to his last
known address. § 6-1.1-24-4. 1 Until 1980, however, Indi1

Because a mortgagee has no title to the mortgaged property under
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ana law did not provide for notice by mail or personal service
to mortgagees of property that was to be sold for nonpayment of taxes. 2
After the required notice is provided, the county treasurer
holds a public auction at which the real property is sold to
the highest bidder. § 6-1.1-24-5. The purchaser acquires a
certificate of sale which constitutes a lien against the real
property for the entire amount paid. §6-1.1-24-9. This
lien is superior to all other liens against the property which
existed at the time the certificate was issued. Ibid.
The tax sale is followed by a two-year redemption period
during which the "owner, occupant, lienholder, or other person who has an interest in" the property may redeem the
property. §6-1.1-25-1. To redeem the property an individual must pay the county treasurer a sum sufficient to
cover the purchase price of the property at the tax sale, the
amount of taxes and special assessments paid by the purchaser following the sale, plus an additional percentage specified in the statute. §§6-1.1-25-2, 6-1.1-25-3. The county
in turn remits the payment to the purchaser of the property
at the tax sale.
If no one redeems the property during the statutory redemption period, the purchaser may apply to the county auditor for a deed to the property. Before executing and delivering the deed, the county auditor must notify the former
owner that he is still entitled to redeem the property.
§6-1.1-25--6. No notice to the mortgagee is required. If
Indiana law, the mortgagee is not considered an "owner" for purposes
of§ 6-1.1-24--4. First Savings & Loan Assn. of Central Indiana v. Furnish, 367 N. E. 2d 596, 600, n. 14 (Ind. App. 1977).
2
Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24--4.2, added in 1980, provides for notice by certified mail to any mortgagee of real property which is subject to tax sale
proceedings, if the mortgagee has annually requested such notice and has
agreed to pay a fee, not to exceed $10, to cover the cost of sending notice.
Because the events in question in this case occurred before the 1980
amendment, the constitutionality of the amendment is not before us .

..
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the property is not redeemed within thirty days, the county
auditor may then execute and deliver a deed for the property
to the purchaser, § 6--1.1-25-4, who thereby acquires "an estate in fee simple absolute, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances." § 6--1.1-25-4(d).
After obtaining a deed, the purchaser may initiate an action to quiet his title to the property. §6.1.1-25-14. The
previous owner, lienholders, and others who claim to have an
interest in the property may no longer redeem the property.
They may defeat the title conveyed by the tax deed only by
proving, inter alia, that the property had not been subject
to, or assessed for, the taxes for which it was sold, that the
taxes had been paid before the sale, or that the property was
properly redeemed before the deed was executed. § 6.1.125-16.
In 1977 Elkhart County initiated proceedings to sell
Moore's property for nonpayment of taxes. The County provided notice as required under the statute: it posted and
published an announcement of the tax sale and mailed notice
to Moore by certified mail. MBM was not informed of the
pending tax sale either by the county auditor or by Moore.
The property was sold for $1,167.75 to appellee Richard Adams on August 8, 1977. Neither Moore nor MBM appeared
at the sale or took steps thereafter to redeem the property.
Following the sale of her property, Moore continued to make
payments each month to MBM, and as a result MBM did not
realize that the property had been sold. On August 16,
1979, MBM first learned of the tax sale. By then the redemption period had run and Moore still owed appellant
$8,237.19.
In November 1979, Adams filed a suit in state court seeking to quiet title to the property. In opposition to Adams'
motion for summary judgment, MBM contended that it had
not received constitutionally adequate notice of the pending
tax sale and of the opportunity to redeem the property following the tax sale. The trial court upheld the Indiana tax
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sale statute against this constitutional challenge. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. 427 N. E. 2d 686 (1981).
We noted probable jurisdiction,-- U. S. - - (1982), and
we now reverse.
II

In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U. S. 306, 314 (1950), this Court recognized that prior to an
action which will affect an interest in life, liberty, or property
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a State must provide "notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections." Invoking this "elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process," ibid, the Court
held that published notice of an action to settle the accounts
of a common trust fund was not sufficient to inform beneficiaries of the trust whose names and addresses were known.
The Court explained that notice by publication was not reasonably calculated to provide actual notice of the pending
proceeding and was therefore inadequate to inform those who
could be notified by more effective means such as personal
service or mailed notice:
"Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back
pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside
the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds
that the information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced
when as here the notice required does not even name
those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does
not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention.
In weighing its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence
with actual notice we are unable to regard this as more
than a feint." I d., at 315. 3
I
3
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82-11-0PINION
MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS v. ADAMS

5

In subsequent cases, this Court has adhered unwaiveringly
to the principle announced in Mullane. In Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112 (1956), for example, the Court
held that notice of condemnation proceedings published in a
Court's previous decisions concerning the requirements of notice in judicial
proceedings: that due process rights may vary depending on whether actions are in rem or in persona. 339 U. S., at 312. See Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 206 (1977).
Traditionally, when a state court
based its jurisdiction upon its authority over the defendant's person, personal service was considered essential for the court to bind individuals who
did not submit to its jurisdiction. See, e. g., Hamilton v. Brown, 161
U. S. 256, 275 (1896); Arendt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 320 (1890);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 726, 733-734 (1878) ("Due process of law
would require appearance or personal service before the defendant could
be personally bound by any judgment rendered."). In Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U. S. 352 (1927), the Court recognized for the first time that service by
registered mail, in place of personal service, may satisfy the requirements
of due process. Constructive notice was never deemed sufficient to bind
an individual in an action in personam.
In contrast, in in rem or quasi in rem proceedings in which jurisdiction
was based on the court's power over property within its territory, see generally Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 196-205, constructive notice to nonresidents was traditionally understood to satisfy the requirements of due
process. In order to settle questions of title to property within its territory, a state court was generally required to proceed by an in rem action
since the court could not otherwise bind nonresidents. At one time constructive service was considered the only means of notifying nonresidents
since it was believed that "[p]rocess from the tribunals of one State cannot
run into another State." Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, at 727. See Ballard v.
Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 255 (1907).
As a result, the nonresident acquired
the duty "to take measures that in some way he shall be represented
If he
when his property is called into requisition." Id., at 262.
"fail[ed] to get notice by the ordinary publications which have been usually
required in such cases, it [was] his misfortune." Ibid.
No corresponding duty was imposed on interested parties who resided
within the State and whose identities were reasonably ascertainable.
Even in actions in rem, such individuals were entitled to personal service.
See, e. g., Arendt v. Griggs, supra, at 326-327. Where the identity of interested residents could not be ascertained after a reasonably diligent inquiry, however, their interests in property could be affected by a proceeding in rem as long as constructive notice was provided. See Hamilton v.
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local newspaper was an inadequate means of informing a
landowner whose name was known to the city and was on the
official records. Similarly, in Schroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U. S. 208 (1962), the Court concluded that publication in a newspaper and posted notices were inadequate to
apprise a property owner of condemnation proceedings when
his name and address were readily ascertainable from both
deed records and tax rolls. Most recently, in Greene v.
Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444 (1982), we held that posting a summons on the door of a tenant's apartment was an inadequate
means of providing notice of forcible entry and detainer actions. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,
436 U. S. 1, 13-15 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U. S. 156, 174-175 (1974); Bank of Marin v. England, 385
U. S. 99, 102 (1966); Covey v. Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 146-147
(1956); City of New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.,
344

u. s. 293, 296-297 (1953).

This case is controlled by the analysis in Mullane. To
begin with, a mortgagee possesses a substantial property interest that is significantly affected by a tax sale. Under Indiana law, a mortgagee acquires a lien on the owner's property which may be conveyed together with the mortgagor's
personal obligation to repay the debt secured by the mortgage. Ind. Code § 32--8-11-7. A mortgagee's security inBrown, supra, at 275; American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 61-62,
65-66 (1911).
Beginning with Mullane, this Court has recognized, contrary to the earlier line of cases, "that an adverse judgment in rem directly affects the
property owner by divesting him of his rights in the property before the
Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 206. In rejecting the traditional
court."
justification for distinguishing between residents and nonresidents and between in rem and in personam actions, the Court has not left all interested
claimants to the vagaries of indirect notice. Our cases have required the
State to make efforts to provide actual notice to all interested parties comparable to the efforts that were previously required only with respect to
identifiable residents. See infra, at 6.
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terest generally has priority over subsequent claims or liens
attaching to the property, and a purchase money mortgage
takes precedence over virtually all other claims or liens including those which antedate the execution of the mortgage.
Ind. Code§ 32--8-11-4. The tax sale immediately and drastically diminishes the value of this security interest by granting the tax-sale purchaser a lien with priority over that of all
other creditors. Ultimately, the tax sale may result in the
complete nullification of the mortgagee's interest, since the
purchaser acquires title free of all liens and other encumbrances at the conclusion of the redemption period.
Since a mortgagee clearly has a legally protected property
interest, he is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale. Cf. Wiswall v. Sampson, 55
U. S. 52, 67 (1852). When the mortgagee is identified in a
mortgage that is publicly recorded, constructive notice by
publication must be supplemented by notice mailed to the
mortgagor's last known available address, or by personal
service. But unles~ mortgagee is not reasonably identifiable, constructive notice alone does not satisfy the mandate
of Mullane. 4
Neither notice by publication and posting, nor mailed notice to the property owner, are means "such as one desirous
of actually informing the [mortgagee] might reasonably adopt
' In this case, the mortgage on file with the county recorder identified
the mortgagee only as "MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS a corporation, of Wayne County, in the State of Ohio." We assume that the mortgagee's address could have been ascertained by reasonably diligent efforts.
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 317
(1950). Simply mailing a letter to "Mennonite Board of Missions, Wayne
County, Ohio," quite likely would have provided actual notice, given "the
well-known skill of postal officials and employees in making proper delivery
of letters defectively addressed." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385,
397-398 (1914). We do not suggest, however, that a governmental body is
required to undertake extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and
whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public record.

•.
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to accomplish it." Mullane, supra, at 315. Because they
are designed primarily to attract prospective purchasers to
the tax sale, publication and posting are unlikely to reach
those who, although they have an interest in the property, do
not make special efforts to keep abreast of such notices.
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, supra, at 116; New York v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra, at 296; Mullane,
supra, at 315. Notice to the property owner, who is not in
privity with his creditor and who has failed to take steps necessary to preserve his own property interest, also cannot be
expected to lead to actual notice to the mortgagee. Cf. N elson v. New York City, 352 U. S. 103, 107-109 (1956). The
County's use of these less reliable forms of notice is not reasonable where, as here, "an inexpensive and efficient mechanism such as mail service is available." Greene v. Lindsey,
supra, at 455.
Personal service or mailed notice is required even though
sophisticated creditors have means at their disposal to
,Q.iscover whether property taxes have not been paid and
1
whether tax sale proceedings are therefore likely to be initiated. In the first place, a mortgage need not involve a complex commercial transaction among knowledgeable parties,
and it may well be the least sophisticated creditor whose security interest is threatened by a tax sale. More importantly, a party's ability to take steps to safeguard its interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation.
It is true that particularly extensive efforts to provide notice
may often be required when the State is aware of a party's
inexperience or incompetence. See, e. g., Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, supra, at 13-15; Covey v.
Somers, supra. But it does not follow that the State may
forego even the relatively modest administrative burden of
providing notice by mail to parties who are particularly resourceful.5 Cf. New York v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.,
• Indeed, notice by mail to the mortgagee may ultimately relieve the
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supra, at 297. Notice by mail or other means as certain to
ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition
to a proceeding which will adversely affect the interests of
any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial
practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable. Furthermore, a mortgagee's knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice
that a tax sale is pending. The latter "was the information
which the [County] was constitutionally obliged to give personally to the appellant-an obligation which the mailing of a
single letter would have discharged." Schroeder v. City of
New York, supra, at 214.
We therefore conclude that the manner of notice provided
to appellant did not meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Accordingly,
the judgment of the Indiana Court of Appeals is reversed and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

county of a more substantial administrative burden if the mortgagee arranges for payment of the delinquent taxes prior to the tax sale.
6
This appeal also presents the question whether, before the county auditor executes and delivers a deed to the tax-sale purchaser, the mortgagee
is constitutionally entitled to notice of its right to redeem the property.
Cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 229 (1946). Because we conclude that
the failure to give adequate notice of the tax sale proceeding deprived appellant of due process of law, we need not reach this question.
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